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CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR. By Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. 
Hassler. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. x, 
193. $5.95. 
In the early 1970s, Congress enacted a host of statutes that re-
quired the expenditure of billions of dollars for environmental pro-
tection. Although the jury is still out on the effectiveness of this 
legislation, recent events indicate that at least a preliminary assess-
ment is in order, perhaps with an eye to procedural reform. Bruce 
Ackerman and William Hassler's reflections on the Clean Air Act of 
19701 should thus spark considerable interest. In Clean Coal/ .Dirty 
Air, they examine the regulation of coal-fired power plants, and find 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Congress, and the 
courts have mishandled a critical environmental issue. In particular, 
the authors charge, the EPA's 1979 air pollution standards were so 
ineptly drafted "that some of the nation's most populous areas will 
end up with a worse environment than would have resulted if the 
new policy had never been put into effect" (p. 2). The regulations 
often require the use of scrubbers,2 even when cheaper options are 
readily available, and ''will cost the public tens of billions of dollars 
to achieve environmental goals that could be reached more cheaply, 
more quickly, and more surely by other means" (p. 2). 
Ackerman and Hassler, however, are concerned more with "seri-
ous breakdowns in the administrative process"3 than with the sub-
stantive merits of a particular agency decision. They contend that 
congressional efforts in the 1970s to reduce the EPA's discretion - a 
process that they call moving beyond the New Deal - prevented 
effective implementation of the Clean Air Act. They conclude that 
the Act in its present form is a failure, but suggest that steps can be 
taken to improve both the Act and administrative lawmaking 
generally. 
From the beginning of the New Deal until the late 1960s, Acker-
man and Hassler note, administrative agencies were enormously in-
dependent. Congress recognized its incompetence to deal 
I. Pub. L. No. 90-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
2. "Scrubbers" are complex devices that remove sulfur from coal-fire smoke as it passes 
through a smokestack. 
3. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New .Deal· Reply, 90 YALE L.J. 1412, 1412 (1981). 
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thoroughly with technical subjects and provided agencies with only 
general policy guidelines. The model New Deal agency was sub-
stantially "insul~t[ed] from central political control ... [and] from 
judicial oversight" (pp. 5-6).4 Judicial review centered on the ques-
tion of whether an agency had fully analyzed a problem before ren-
dering its decision rather than on the decision itself; only if the 
decision was "arbitrary and capricious" would courts second-guess 
the substantive determinations of agency policy-makers. 
By the time that concern for the environment surfaced in the late 
1960s, the style of expert agency policy-making developed during the 
New Deal had become unpopular. Many observers believed that 
agency officials were opportunistic lawyers rather than dedicated ex-
perts, and that agency independence served primarily to conceal the 
"capture" of agencies by special interest groups (p. 7). Congress, 
under pressure to reform the administrative process, responded with 
what the authors term an "agency-forcing statute" (p. 3) - one that 
sharply curtailed the agency's discretion. The 1970 Act specifically 
instructed the EPA to set quantitative clean air standards that were 
to be reached by 1977. The Act, moreover, "presumed to specify the 
means of achieving clean air objectives" for new plants (p. 11). Con-
gressional directives gave statutory prominence to technological pu-
rification methods in new plants and resulted in decisions that were 
made in an "ecological and economic vacuum" (p. 12). In 1977, 
Congress went even further,S ignoring the differences in sulfur con-
tent between Eastern and Western coal for political reasons and forc-
ing the scrubbing question onto the EPA's agenda. 
The book's thesis is that Congress has gone too far beyond the 
New Deal. Although the authors concede that Congress is uniquely 
equipped to make basic policy choices - and to reconsider those 
choices after changes in political opinion (p. 54) - they caution that 
Congress is not equipped to conduct expert policy analyses oftechni- • 
cal problems. Agencies should thus be empowered and, indeed, re-
quired to consider particular problems and to formulate programs 
designed to achieve most efficiently the ends specified by Congress. 
Only then can we avoid the "Alphonse-Gaston" problem that Acker-
man and Hassler identify in the EPA's post-1977 actions: 
[O]ne player, Congress, enacts an agency-forcing statute with the ex-
pectation that the other player will subject a particular policy to hard-
headed consideration. The second player, the agency, thinks that 
Congress has already made the policy judgment and narrowly confines 
its policy review. Each player allows the other to drop the ball: an 
4. Congress, however, was not powerless to deal with agency decisions. Through its ap-
pointment and funding powers, Congress could translate sustained shifts in national opinion 
into policy changes. For the most part, though, Congress deferred to agencies in technical 
areas. 
5. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685. 
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important policy is adopted without the hard thinking that should be 
required of a sound lawmaking enterprise. [Pp. 104-05.] 
The EPA has yet to subject scrubbers to a full inquiry. 
To prevent such gaps in the formulation of public policy, Acker-
man and Hassler suggest that administrative actions taken under 
agency-forcing statutes should be subjected to a more searching level 
of judicial review than the traditional "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard (p. 105). Applying the "principle of full inquiry" to the 
scrubbing controversy, they recommend remanding the 1979 stan-
dard to the EPA "for further consideration" (p. 107).6 
Those interested in environmental and administrative law will 
find Clean Coal/ .Dirty Air both thought-provoking and disturbing. 
Combined with strict judicial review to ensure agency adherence to 
the "principle of full inquiry," agency-forcing statutes may go a long 
way toward solving the problems of agency capture that troubled 
commentators and Congress in the late 1960s. But the extent to 
which politics dominates congressional and administrative policy-
making is disheartening, and the authors off er no real solution to this 
problem. If our Congressmen read this book7 before rewriting the 
Clean Air Act, 8 and we eventually breathe easier, it will be because 
the book asks the right questions, not because it gives any answers. 
6. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently upheld the EPA's 
regulations dealing with emissions from coal-fired plants. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F,2d 298 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
7. A slightly shorter version of this work appeared in the Yale Law Journal before publica-
tion as a book. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New J)eal· Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 
YALE LJ. 1466 (1980). See also Smith & Randle, Comment on Beyond the New Deal, 90 
YALE LJ. 1398 (1981); Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 2. 
8. The rewriting process is underway. See Natl. L.J., Sept. 28, 1981, at 6, col. 4. 
